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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYEES 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Focusing on employees as stakeholders, we analyse corporate 
governance initiatives in South Africa encouraging and 
requiring companies to look beyond their shareholders’ 
interests.  Successive non- binding Codes and the provisions of 
the recent Companies Act 2008 promoting this have been 
lauded by many commentators. The Companies Act 2008 
provides certain opportunities for employees and their 
representatives to exercise influence at the margins.  We 
nevertheless question how far current corporate governance 
initiatives are adequate to promote employee interests. On the 
basis of three case studies of how companies have responded to 
employees as stakeholders, we conclude that in fact more 
stringent regulation is required.     
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although not universally accepted, the argument that companies 
have responsibilities beyond those to shareholders is now 
common both globally and in South African public discussion. 1   
                                                          
1 The article builds upon previous work by one of the authors, Miles, L. & 
Jones, M. “The Prospects for Corporate Governance Operating as a 
Vehicle for Social Change in South Africa” (2009), Deakin Law Review, 
14, 1, 53 – 77.  For arguments along ‘the business of business’ lines see 
the following: Friedman, M. (1998), “The social responsibility of business 
is to increase its profits”, New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970, 
at  <http://www-
rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/dunnweb/rprnts.friedman.dunn.pdf>,  Sternberg, E. 
(1997) “The Defects of Stakeholder Theory”, Corporate Governance, 5, 1, 
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In South Africa, this is a particularly pertinent discourse in view 
of the strong social and economic challenges facing the country, 
a fragmented and disparate society marked by extreme contrasts.  
On the one hand it boasts a highly developed infrastructure and 
economy on a par with most developed nations, but on the other 
it faces high unemployment, a severe housing shortage, 
environmental degradation, spiralling violent crime, low skills 
levels and one of the worst HIV/AIDS epidemics in the world.2 
The argument advanced by some influential economists, that 
national economic development must take social justice into 
account, appears especially relevant in this context.3 
 
The South African debate is part of a wider one and concerns 
the extent to which companies should contribute to 
developmental agendas and how far they should simply follow a 
narrower definition of their own interests. The idea that 
companies have wide social responsibilities is not new – indeed, 
it has engaged the interest of academics since the 1980s4 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 – 10, Jensen, MC. (2001) “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, 
and the Corporate Objective Function”, Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, 14, 3, 8 – 21, Coelho, PRP, McClure, JE and Spry, JA (2003) 
“The Social Responsibility of Corporate Management: A Classical 
Critique”, Mid-American Journal of Business, 18, 1, 15 – 24, Sundaram, 
A. & Inkpen, A. (2004), “The corporate objective revisited” Organization 
Science, 15, 3, 350 – 363 
2 Hamann, R. (2006), “Can business made decisive contributions to 
development? Towards a Research Agenda on Corporate Citizenship and 
Beyond”, Development Southern Africa, 23, 2: 175 – 195, at 180, UN 
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review - South Africa, 23 May 2008, A/HRC/8/32; 
A/HRC/WG.6/1/ZAF/4, available at 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4857aa23d.html>  
3 Elliott, KA & Freeman, RB, Can Labour Standards Improve Under 
Globalization? Washington, Institute for International Economics, 2003. 
4 In particular, see Freeman, RE (1994), “The Politics of Stakeholder 
Theory: Some Future Directions” Business Ethics Quarterly, 4, 4, 409 – 
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has been heavily promoted by international organisations such 
as the UN,5 the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development6 and the World Economic Forum.7 These bodies 
have long campaigned for companies to behave as good 
‘corporate citizens’, be more inclusive in their approach and to 
discharge their responsibilities to the wider community.8   
 
We examine official codes, advice and hard law in South 
African corporate governance prompting companies to look 
beyond the interests of their shareholders, and question how far 
they are likely to suffice to meet deep socio-economic 
challenges. We do so with special reference to employees as 
stakeholders.  
                                                                                                                                                 
421, Donaldson, T. & Preston, LE. (1995) “The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications” The Academy of 
Management Review, 20, 1, 65 – 91, Freeman, RE & Evan, W. (1990), 
“Corporate governance: A stakeholder interpretation” Journal of 
Behavourial Economics, 19, 4, 337–359, Phillips, R. (1997), “Stakeholder 
theory and a principle of fairness. Business Ethics Quarterly, 7, 51 – 66, 
Phillips, R. & Reichart, J. (1998), “The environment as a stakeholder: A 
fairness-based Approach” Journal of Business Ethics, 23, 185 – 197, 
Goodpaster, K. (1991), “Business ethics and stakeholder analysis”, 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 1, 1, 53 – 73, Clarkson, M. (1995) “A 
stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social 
performance”, Academy of Management Review, 20, 92 – 117, Mitchell, R. 
Agle, B. & Wood, D. (1997), “Toward a theory of stakeholder 
identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really 
counts”, Academy of Management Review, 22, 853 – 886. 
5 See for example, the UN Global Compact Principles at 
<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AbouttheGC/TheTENPrinciples/index.
html>  
6 Their website may be consulted at 
<http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?MenuID
=1>   
7 See <http://www.weforum.org/en/index.htm>. 
8 See for example Economic Commission for Africa, “An Overview of 
corporate governance and accountability in Southern Africa” 2007, 1 – 34, 
at 11, at <http://www.uneca.org/srdc/sa/publications/CorporateGovernace-
Accountability-SA.pdf> . 
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The article is structured as follows.  Part 2 describes the South 
African corporate governance framework and discusses the 
recently highlighted ‘inclusive approach’, in recognising the 
interests of a wide group of stakeholders (as they are described 
in South African post-Apartheid public discussion), and its 
embodiment in law, codes and official guidance.  It concludes 
by arguing that the conditions required to facilitate an ‘inclusive 
approach’ in South Africa are in fact either underdeveloped or 
absent. Part 3 presents three case studies in areas of central 
interest to employees. Part 4 concludes, arguing that that the 
state will be forced to increase its regulatory involvement if 
employee needs are to be met.  
 
2. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the South African corporate governance framework 
has mirrored that in the UK. The corporate governance regime  
is characterised by a unitary board system, a reliance on capital 
markets to raise finance, a strong legal framework to protect 
shareholder rights and a set of self-regulatory measures 
designed to shape management behaviour. As in the UK, two 
regimes exist in relation to corporate governance law: first, legal 
sources (company legislation and case law), and second, a 
system of (non-binding) codes of best practice to guide 
corporate behaviour.9  
                                                          
9 For a useful discussion of the corporate governance regime in South 
Africa, see Aka, PC. (2007) “Corporate Governance in South Africa: 
Analysing the Dynamics of Corporate Governance Reforms in the 
‘Rainbow Nation’” North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
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The South African government adopted new approaches to 
economic development after the end of apartheid in 1994. 
Central to these initiatives was its ‘social contract’ with civil 
society, the corporate sector and organised labour to generate 
the requisite domestic capital as well as to re-invigorate the 
economy.10 Companies were expected by government to play a 
role in meeting the socio-economic challenges facing the 
country. This idea gained the support of many South African 
academics who believed that the involvement of companies in 
meeting these challenges was not only compatible with 
traditional African values but was also fundamental to long term 
corporate success and might constitute a model for the African 
continent.11  
                                                                                                                                                 
Commercial Regulation, 33, 2, 219 – 292 and West, A. (2006), 
“Theorising South Africa’s Corporate Governance’ Journal of Business 
Ethics, 68, 4, 433 – 448. 
10 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review - South Africa, 23 May 2008, A/HRC/8/32; 
A/HRC/WG.6/1/ZAF/4, available at 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4857aa23d.html>  
11 See Andreasson, S. (2009), “Understanding corporate governance 
reform in South Africa: Anglo-American divergence, the King Reports and 
hybridization” at <http://works.bepress.com/stefan_andreasson/8> , West, 
A. (2006), “Theorising South Africa’s corporate governance”, Journal of 
Business Ethics, 68, 433 – 448, Vaughn, M. & Ryan, LV (2006), 
“Corporate governance in South Africa: a bellwether for the continent?” 
Corporate Governance, 14, 5, 504 – 512, Visser, W. Business Frontiers, 
Social Responsibility, Sustainable Development and Economic Justice, 
(2005), ICFAI Books, Chapter 25, Rossouw, GJ, van der Watt, A & 
Malan, DP, (2002), “Corporate Governance in South Africa” Journal of 
Business Ethics, 37, 3, 289 – 302. King I, II and III all embrace concepts 
such as sustainability and business ethics and are underpinned by the 
principles of community, sharing and generosity (also known as the South 
African Ubuntu concept). See Karsten, L. & Illa, H. “Ubuntu as a key 
African management concept: contextual background and practical 
insights for knowledge application” Journal of Managerial Psychology, 
(2005), 20, 7, 607 – 620 and Lutz, D. “African Ubuntu Philosophy and 
Global Management” Journal of Business Ethics, 2009, 84, 3, 313 – 328 
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The government therefore sought to influence how companies 
defined their interests. It has recognised that these interests were 
not self-evident to actors within companies themselves.  Nor are 
they in reality defined in isolation, but rather through internal 
and external negotiation processes.12  Its approach to setting the 
legal parameters for these processes has sought to influence 
companies through both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ means.   
 
2.2 THE COMPANIES ACT AND THE ‘INCLUSIVE 
APROACH’ 
Traditionally, South African company law concentrated on the 
shareholder wealth maximisation approach and required 
directors to exercise their powers for the benefit of the company 
as a whole.13 The interests of the company were often 
synonymous with those of shareholders. Thus, directors had no 
legal duty to consider the interests of employees, creditors, 
suppliers or society, except in very limited circumstances, such 
                                                                                                                                                 
which discuss Ubuntu as a theory of management consistent with South 
African values. 
12 Hay, C. “Constructivist institutionalism...Or, why ideas into interests 
don’t go.” Paper presented to the American Political Science Association 
Philadelphia 31 August, 2006, at <www.allacademic.com/meta/p152815>.  
Hay, C., ‘Political Ontology’ in R.E. Goodin and C. Tilly (eds.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006.  
13 The duties of directors are regulated by statute e.g. ss234–240 
Companies Act 1973 which deal with the disclosure of conflict of interests 
that a director may have in a contract, and the common law (fiduciary 
duties of good faith (duty to prevent a conflict of interests, not exceed the 
limitation of their powers, maintain an unfettered discretion and exercise 
their powers for the purpose for which they were conferred), and the duty 
to act with the necessary care and skill when performing his or her duties. 
For case law, see, for example, Symington v Pretoria-Oos Privaat 
Hospitaal Bedryfs (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 550 (SCA), Cyberscene Ltd v i-
Kiosk Internet and Information (Pty) Ltd 2000 (3) SA 806 (C), Sibex 
Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Injectaseal CC 1988 (2) SA 54 (T). 
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as in the case of company insolvency.14 The recent reform of 
South African company law, outlined in a policy paper entitled 
South African Company Law for the 21st Century – Guidelines 
for Corporate Law Reform 2004, 15 sought to change this. It 
posited a move away from the traditional model toward the 
concept of “enlightened shareholder value”, following 
developments in the UK in this regard. The South African 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) formulated a new 
approach to corporate governance:  
 
‘A company should have as its objective the conduct of business 
activities with a view to enhancing the economic success of the 
corporation, taking into account, as appropriate, the legitimate 
interests of other stakeholder constituencies’16 
 
This endorsed the approach taken in successive King Reports 
(discussed in more detail in the next section) that the company 
is a social as well as an economic institution and that its pursuit 
                                                          
14 Readers will benefit particularly from referring to Aka (2007), 
Andreasson (2009) and West (2006), which provide helpful discussions 
with regard to the South African corporate governance framework. This is 
based on that in the UK, which has traditionally concentrated on 
shareholder interests. The authors discuss how this emphasis has evolved 
and consider the tone of recent academic debate on this matter.   
15 The South African Department of Trade and Industry released the paper 
to set out the basis for a redraft of its Companies Act 1973. The intention 
was to bring the law into line with 21st century requirements, and to 
ensure a framework which will promote growth, good governance, 
confidence and competitiveness. The paper can be viewed at <http://us-
cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/01326_notice1183. 
pdf>  
16 Ibid. at 24 – 25. Specific reference to the UK approach was made in the 
2004 policy paper (pp. 19, 20, 22). The new approach would compel 
directors to have regard, where appropriate, to the interests of stakeholders, 
but with shareholders’ interests nevertheless retaining primacy. 
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of economic objectives should be constrained by social and 
environmental imperatives. This new formulation has passed 
into the recent Companies Act 2008. That Act was approved by 
Parliament and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) and 
is expected to be effective in July 2010.17 
 
Section 76 of the Act spells out the duties of directors. This 
codification of the duties of directors is a new development as 
its predecessor, the Companies Act 1973, did not contain clear 
guidance regarding the duties and liabilities of directors, with 
the result that these issues were governed by the common law 
and soft corporate governance codes. However, the new Act fell 
short of legislating on the precise content of the duty of 
directors, limiting itself to stating that:   
A director of a company, when acting in that capacity, must 
exercise the powers and perform the functions of director— 
(a) in good faith and for a proper purpose; 
(b) in the best interests of the company; and 
(c) with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may 
reasonably be expected of a person— 
(i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as 
those carried out by that director; and 
(ii) having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that 
director. 
 
The intention was for the judiciary to delineate the ambit of s76 
through the development of common law. The weight given, 
over the years, to the ‘inclusive approach’ ‘corporate 
citizenship’ and ‘corporate social responsibility’ in King I, II 
and III (indeed, the drafting of King III was undertaken 
                                                          
17 This can be viewed at 
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approximately at the same time as the Companies Act 2008) 
seems likely significantly to influence the interpretation of this 
duty. It will be interesting to see the extent to which the 
willingness of the judiciary in South Africa to do so develops. 
 
The new Act however, contains provisions of direct relevance 
to stakeholders, allowing them to intervene directly when their 
interests are harmed. In relation to employees, these exist in 
three key areas:  (a) director delinquency and probation, (b) 
business rescue proceedings (‘administration’) and (c) the 
commencement of derivative actions. In the first area, an 
application can be made to the court by unions or other 
employee representatives for a director to be declared 
delinquent or placed on probation. Section 162 lists a number of 
circumstances where a declaration must be made. These include 
(i) where the directors has grossly abused his position, (ii) 
intentionally or by gross negligence inflicted harm upon the 
company, or (iii) acted in a manner that amounted to gross 
negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust.18 Similarly, a 
court may make an order placing a director on probation if, 
inter alia, he acted in a manner materially inconsistent with his 
duties as a director. Specified punitive and remedial actions 
may follow on a declaration of delinquency or probation.19   
                                                                                                                                                 
<http://www.saica.co.za/Portals/0/Technical/act71_2008.pdf>  
18 s162(5)  Companies Act 2008 
19 s162(10). These include the director having to undertake a designated 
programme of remedial education, carrying out a designated programme of 
community service, paying compensation to any person adversely affected 
by his conduct, be supervised by a mentor in any future participation as a 
director while the order remains in force; or be limited to serving as a 
director of a private company, or of a company of which that person is the 
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In the second area, business rescue proceedings can be invoked 
by an ‘affected person’. Section 128 of the Act provides that an 
‘affected person’ includes employees, their trade union or any 
other representative. The Act recognises the interests of these 
affected persons, and provides for their extensive participation 
in the development and approval of a business rescue plan.20 
Importantly, during business rescue proceedings, employees of 
the company must continue to be employed on the same terms 
and conditions as formerly – notwithstanding any provision of 
an agreement to the contrary.21  
 
In the third area, the Companies Act 2008 provides an 
opportunity not only for shareholders, but for the first time, 
other stakeholders (including employees) to commence 
derivative actions against the board.22 This is much broader than 
the equivalent UK provision, which limits the opportunity to 
commence such actions to shareholders only.23 The ability to 
bring a derivative action is a significant tool which constitutes a 
last resort mechanism for holding directors accountable for 
certain actions, even where they enjoyed the support of the 
majority of shareholders.24 
                                                                                                                                                 
sole shareholder. If a director is declared delinquent, this may subsist for 7 
years, whereas an order for probation, for 5 years. 
20 s150-154 Companies Act 2008 
21 s136 Companies Act 2008 
22 s165 Companies Act 2008 
23 See ss260-264 UK Companies Act 2006 
24 s165(14) Companies Act 2008. See also C Stein, “Big business beware – 
the class and derivative actions are coming! ”at 
<http://www.legal500.com/c/south-africa/developments/8676> 
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These provisions certainly provide employees and their 
representatives with leverage possibilities at the extremes of 
director behavior.  In the case of director delinquency, they give 
employee representatives the right to threaten a director’s 
position and thereby to exercise some influence.  In the case of 
businesses in crisis (particularly relevant in the current global 
situation) they give employees the possibility of either delaying 
redundancies and/or of launching alternative plans for business 
rescue.  In both areas, employees and representative employee 
institutions are provided with possibilities for actively enforcing 
certain standards of corporate conduct, within significant albeit 
limited fields.  Finally, the opportunity for employees to 
commence derivative actions in respect of wrongs committed 
against the company which the company is not willing to pursue 
in its own right, provides a powerful tool for employees to 
intervene when the wrong committed against the company also 
harmed their interests.   
 
2.3 SOFT LAW: NON-LEGAL CODES AND THE 
‘INCLUSIVE APPROACH’ 
Considerably more attention has, over the years, been given to 
stakeholders in various non-binding corporate governance codes 
of practice (soft law) in South Africa. They date back to 1994 
and were part of the post-apartheid mandate to rebuild the 
economy. These Codes, King I (1994), II (2002) and III (2009) 
progressively developed the idea of an ‘inclusive approach’ to 
corporate governance as outlined above. With the new 
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Companies Act 2008 coming into force, these Codes can 
establish a framework within which the courts can interpret the 
directors’ duties.  Reliance on non-binding Codes of Practice to 
give meaning to the duties of directors is not new – the English 
courts for example, give considerable weight to provisions of 
the Combined Code (despite its non binding nature) in  
determining the nature of duties of directors under the law.25 
South African courts can similarly delineate the ambit of s76 
with the help of the King Codes. Exactly how this will evolve 
will of course depend on judicial will to take an active role in 
interpreting and developing the newly codified duty in a way 
which is receptive and sympathetic to stakeholder interests.26  
 
The first Code of Corporate Governance, King I, published in 
1994 by the Department of Trade and Industry27 set out the 
                                                          
25 The way the UK courts have done this is demonstrated in Goulding, S., 
Miles, L. & Schall, A. “Judicial Enforcement of Extra-Legal Codes in UK 
and German Company Law – Including Observations on OLG Schleswig-
Holstein” NZG 2004, 669 (Mobilcom ll) and LG Muenchen l, NZG 2004, 
626 (Hypovereinsbank),  European Company and Financial Law Review, 
(2005), Vol 2(1), 20-62.  
26 There is evidence that South African courts are moving in this direction 
in environmental matters. See Minister of Water and Forestry v Stilfontein 
Gold Mining 2006 (5) SA 333 (W), where company directors had refused 
to comply with an order from the Ministry to drain water from a mine on 
health and safety grounds, arguing that it was not possible for the company 
to comply with the directives and still remain financially viable. The court 
judged that their conduct flew in the face of what was recommended in the 
code of corporate practices and conduct recommended by the King 
Committee when the South African corporate community had, widely and 
uniformly, endorsed their findings and recommendations. The King 
Committee had all along stressed that one of the characteristics of good 
corporate governance was social responsibility. The directors were ordered 
to comply with the order. The case can be read at 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2006/260.html> see in 
particular Paragraphs 16.7 – 16.9 where reference is made to King II.  
27 See P Armstrong (1995) “The King Report on Corporate Governance” 
Juta’s Business Law, 3, 65–70. 
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potential direction of corporate governance post-apartheid. 
Despite incorporating a code based on that in the UK – with an 
emphasis on shareholder protection – it urged a participative 
corporate governance system, articulating a need for companies 
to recognise that they no longer acted independently from the 
society and environment in which they operated.28 King II, 
published in 2002, took this ‘inclusive approach’ further,29 
recommending the introduction of ‘triple bottom line’ 
reporting.30 It re-iterated the stance taken in King I, stressing 
that companies must recognise that they did not act 
independently from the societies in which they operated. Indeed, 
any exclusion of stakeholders would run counter to the 
traditional African values of co-existence, collectiveness and 
                                                          
28 King I was recognised internationally, when published, as the most 
comprehensive publication on the subject embracing an inclusive approach 
to corporate governance. See 
<http://www.iodsa.co.za/king.asp#King%20I%20Report%20-%201994> . 
See T Mongalo, (2004), “South Africanising Company law for a Modern 
Global Economy” South African Law Journal, 93 – 116, at 114. For 
example, King I provides in Chapter 20, Paragraph 13, that a company’s 
code of ethics should “…Be developed in such a way as to involve all its 
stakeholders to infuse its culture…” See <http:// 
<www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/king_i_sa.pdf> 
29 King II recognised that companies are increasingly expected to behave 
as good corporate citizens, due to their influence over stakeholders such as 
employees, communities and the environment. Companies rely on these 
stakeholders to sustain their operations and for maintaining their license to 
operate. Therefore, they must acquire a sound understanding of their 
responsibilities to stakeholders. King II recommends that every company 
should report annually on their policies and practices pertaining to how the 
interests of stakeholders are met. Implementing the ‘inclusive approach’ 
will mean companies must define their purpose, identify the values by 
which they carry out their activities and communicate these to 
stakeholders. These three factors should be combined in developing 
strategies to achieve the company’s aim to be sustainable in the long-run. 
See Paragraphs 5.3, 6, 35, and 37 of the Executive Summary of the King II 
Report, (pages 7 and 17) at <http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ukznms/King-
ReportExec-sum.pdf>. 
30 Principle 5 of King II Code 
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consensus.31 Thus, when developing company strategy, 
corporate governance should extend to the non-financial aspects 
of operations such as the promotion of black empowerment and 
environmental protection together with the advancement of 
social equality.  This theme was endorsed in King III (February 
2009)32, which stated that it ‘seeks to emphasise the inclusive 
approach of governance.’33 In fact, King III is particularly 
significant because it explicitly explained that the ‘inclusive 
approach’ went further than the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ 
model adopted in the UK.  
 
Under the UK model, the legitimate interests and expectations 
of stakeholders are de jure secondary. Stakeholders are 
generally only considered in so far as it would be in the interests 
of shareholders to do so.34 The board of directors should 
consider the legitimate interests and expectations of 
stakeholders but merely as an instrument to serve shareholders’s 
interests. By contrast, King III provides that shareholders do not 
have a predetermined place of precedence over other 
stakeholders. In fact, the interests of any stakeholder may be 
                                                          
31 Paragraph 38 of the Executive Summary of the King II Report, (pages 
17 & 18)  
32 King III (Report) can be viewed at 
<http://african.ipapercms.dk/IOD/KINGIII/kingiiireport/> . The Code can 
be viewed at < http://african.ipapercms.dk/IOD/KINGIII/kingiiicode/>. 
King III will be effective from 1 March 2010 and until then, King II will 
apply. 
33 Page 11 of King III Code 
34 S 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006. One of the authors has discussed 
the development of this duty in the UK in detail, see Schall, A. Miles, L.  
& Goulding, S. “Enhancing the interests of non-member stakeholders 
through disclosure: The new reporting regime in the United Kingdom” 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies, (2006), 6, 2, 299 – 328 for a discussion 
of the potential impact the new law on directors. 
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given precedence based on what is believed to serve the best 
interests of the company at any particular point. Importantly, the 
best interests of the company should be interpreted within the 
parameters of the company as a sustainable enterprise and as a 
responsible corporate citizen. King III believed that this 
approach would give effect to the notion of redefining success 
in terms of lasting positive effects for all stakeholders.35 
 
Last but not least, King II and III required that the fulfilment of 
companies’ obligations to stakeholders must be measured, 
calculated, audited and reported in the same way as their 
financial performance. King II required companies to 
implement ‘sustainability reporting’ as a core aspect of 
corporate governance. King III went further, in that whereas in 
the past such reporting could be done separately from and in 
addition to financial reporting, it should now be integrated with 
the latter.36 Thus it stated in Chapter 9 that ‘Sustainability 
reporting and disclosure should be integrated with the 
company’s financial reporting’ and that ‘Reporting effectively 
about the goals and strategies of the company, as well as its 
performance with regard to economic, social and 
environmental issues, also serves to align the company with the 
legitimate interests and expectations of its stakeholders, and at 
the same time, obtain stakeholder buy in and support for the 
objectives that the company is pursuing. This support can prove 
to be invaluable during difficult times, for example, when the 
company needs certain approvals or authority, or when it needs 
                                                          
35 Page 12 of King III Code 
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and relies on the confidence and loyalty of customers.’37 It 
further provided that sustainability reporting and disclosure 
‘…should be independently assured’ and that ‘General 
oversight and reporting of sustainability should be delegated by 
the board to the audit committee’.38 This is now widely 
described as ‘triple bottom line reporting’.   
 
The benefits of ‘triple bottom line’ reporting39 have been judged 
to be many. It has been suggested that it provides the company 
with incentives to enhance its social performance, emphasises 
the company’s positive actions, signifies its respect for ‘CSR’ 
and demonstrates its legitimacy before stakeholders.40 It is also 
held to facilitate stakeholder engagement and to make 
information available which can become the basis of ongoing 
stakeholder communication.41 Finally, it is suggested that if 
stakeholders were given the information they need, they would 
be empowered to hold companies accountable for their actions, 
through exerting pressure and negotiating with them.42 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 King III Report, Principle 9.2, at 109 
37 King III Report, at 108 
38 King III Report, Principle 9.3, at 110. There was no such requirement in 
King II. 
39 King did not use the words ‘triple bottom line’ reporting, using instead 
‘integrated sustainability reporting’. However both kinds of reporting refer 
to the same issues, namely economic, social and environmental 
performance.  
40 C Dawkins & FW Ngunjiri, “Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting 
In South Africa: A Descriptive and Comparative Analysis”, Journal of 
Business Communication, 2008, 45, 3, 286 – 307, at 288 – 289. 
41 M Painter Morland, (2006) “TBL as social grammar: Integrating CSR 
and Corporate Codes of Conduct” Business Ethics: A European Review, 
15, 4, 352 – 364, at 358. 
42 See Gunningham, N, Kagan, R. & Thornton, D. (2004), “Social License 
and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance”, 
Law & Social Inquiry, 29, 307 – 341, which discusses how stakeholders 
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prospect of ‘triple bottom line’ reporting contributing to the 
welfare of stakeholders is regarded as a contemporary and 
exciting notion. Since its inception, the term has spread ‘like 
wild fire’43 and has been embraced enthusiastically by 
stakeholder organisations, ‘ethical’ investment funds, 
accounting firms44, multinationals, governments and 
academia.45  
 
Some incentives exist for companies to realise these aspirations.  
Despite the non-binding nature of the King Codes, the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange requires as a condition of 
listing that companies must comply with their provisions.  
                                                                                                                                                 
can exploit the corporate ‘social license’ in order to compel companies to 
improve their environmental performance. 
43 Norman, W. & McDonald, C. (2004), “Getting to the Bottom of TBL” 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 14, 2, 243 – 262, at 244.  
44 See for example, the KPMG International Survey of Corporate 
Sustainability Reporting 2008, at 
http://www.kpmg.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/International-corporate-
responsibility-survey-2008.pdf , which is regarded as the most 
comprehensive conducted on this subject to date. It examined reporting 
trends among the world’s largest companies. The sixth in a series 
conducted by KPMG and various partners since 1993 it is issued every 
three years. 22 of KPMG’s member firms voluntarily participated in this 
study including: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, 
Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States. See 
http://www.csrwire.com/News/13565.html . 
45 Readers may wish to consult A Henriques & J Richardson, The Triple 
Bottom Line: Does it All Add Up? - Assessing the Sustainability of 
Business and CSR, 2004, (Earthscan: UK), A Savitz & K Weber, The 
Triple Bottom Line: How Today's Best-run Companies Are Achieving 
Economic, Social and Environmental Success - And How You Can Too, 
2006, (Jossey Bass: San Francisco) and B Willard, The Sustainability 
Advantage: Seven Business Case Benefits of a Triple Bottom Line 
(Conscientious Commerce), 2002, (New Society Publishers: Canada), 
which explore the use of TBL reporting and discusses how companies 
have used TBL concepts to address sustainability issues to good effect. 
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Those who do not do so run the risk of damaging their 
reputations and share prices and, ultimately, of being de-listed. 
So, now, under King III, where companies have applied the 
Code and best practice recommendations, they must state this 
positively to their stakeholders. Where a specific principle or 
recommendation has not been applied, the board must explain 
the reasons. In short, the approach is, in the Code’s terms, 
‘apply or explain’. This will, in theory at least, allow 
stakeholders to comment on and challenge the board to improve 
the standard of governance.46 
 
2.4 DOES ‘TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE’ REPORTING 
PROMOTE AN ‘INCLUSIVE APPROACH’?  
Whether ‘triple bottom line’ reporting as an accounting concept 
actually ensures that the interests of stakeholders are adequately 
taken into account is questionable.  A vast body of research 
argues that such reporting is neither reliable nor relevant. We 
deal briefly with these difficulties surrounding ‘triple bottom 
line’ reporting; one of the authors has addressed the issue 
extensively elsewhere.47  
 
                                                          
46 Pages 6 and 16 of King III Code 
47 See Miles, L. & Jones, M. “The Prospects for Corporate Governance 
Operating as a Vehicle for Social Change in South Africa” (2009), Deakin 
Law Review, 14, 1, 53 – 77. See also Hess, D. (2007) “Social Reporting 
And New Governance Regulation: The Prospects Of Achieving Corporate 
Accountability Through Transparency” Business Ethics Quarterly, 17, 3, 
453 – 476, Robins, F. (2006), “The Challenge of TBL: A Responsibility to 
Whom?” Business and Society Review, 111, 1, 1 – 14, Norman, W. & 
MacDonald, C. (2004), Berthelot, S. Cormier D. & Magnan, M. (2003), 
“Environmental Disclosure Research: Review and Synthesis”, Journal of 
Accounting Literature, 22, 1 – 44. 
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The first difficulty is that ‘triple bottom line’ reporting cannot 
be measured or aggregated. In the absence of an (as yet) widely 
accepted methodology, it is impossible to quantify a company’s 
social or environmental performance in a way which reduces 
these to a bottom-line result.48 For example, how does one 
interpret the following information in an annual report?  
(a) it is increasing the proportion of black employees by 
5%, 
(b) it has cut down emissions by 10%, 
(c) it directed 22% of its budget to community-based 
programs, 
(d) 175 workers participated in its training programs, and 
(e) it invested R1.5 million into R&D addressing 
HIV/AIDS 
 
Does the information prove that the company’s social and 
environmental bottom lines are improved? Have stakeholder 
concerns been met? Taken as a whole, what does it all mean? 
Answers to these questions can only be subjective, reflecting 
the personal values of the person judging them, rather than 
those of the stakeholders.49 It is not possible adequately to 
measure benefits to society and the environment in monetary 
terms, as it is with financial profit, there being no direct social 
or environmental equivalents to revenue, expenses, losses, 
assets and liabilities.50 
                                                          
48  See Norman and MacDonald, (2004), 249 – 251  
49  R Price, What Triple Bottom Line?: Actually, It’s All Social 
<http://www.kiri-
ganai.com.au/attachments/publications/What%20Triple%20Bottom%20Li
ne%20-%20It%27s%20all%20Social.pdf> at 23 June 2009. 
50 See F Robins, (2006), at 1- 2, Norman & MacDonald, (2004), at 250. 
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It has been argued that ‘triple bottom line’ reporting simply 
allows companies to make vague commitments to social and 
environmental concerns. As there is no real benchmark to 
measure their performance against, companies do not have to be 
concerned about being compared to others in the same industry 
or whether their social and environmental bottom lines have 
shown declining performance over the years.51  
 
Evidence to date demonstrates that reporting requirements have 
in fact done little to meet stakeholder needs. The Socially 
Responsible Investment (SRI) Index of the Johannesburg 
Securities Exchange (membership of the Index is dependent on 
companies’ performance of their ‘triple bottom line’ obligations) 
is an important influence on shareholder perceptions.  A paper 
on the index’s functioning in practice  shows that companies 
participating in the assessment process merely described their 
sustainability process in an ‘aspirational and anecdotal manner’, 
and ‘in a general, rather than objective and direct manner’.52 
Some companies have scored themselves highly despite their 
poor commitment to stakeholder issues.53 Few have committed 
themselves to achieving specific targets or reporting their 
performance against these targets. Research shows that the 
                                                          
51  See Norman & McDonald, (2004), at 256 
52 D Sonnenberg & R Hamann, (2006), “The JSE Socially Responsible 
Investment Index and the State of Sustainability Reporting in South 
Africa” Development Southern Africa, 23, 2, 305 – 320 
53 Bond, P. (2008) “Social Movements and CSR in South Africa” 
Development and Change, 39, 6, 1037 - 1052 which discusses that having 
lost confidence in the state regulation and CSR, civil society in South 
Africa are themselves tackling corporate power and facilitating change. 
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Index is poorly monitored54 and that there is little comparative 
or quantitative information. Finally, only a small proportion of 
companies have submitted their sustainability reporting to 
independent auditors. The KPMG International Survey of 
Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2008 referred to above 
showed that although 86% of companies in South Africa 
practised some sustainability reporting, only 15% sought 
external verification of these reports,  although this is now set to 
change, because King III requires companies to subject such 
reporting to independent verification. 
 
2.5 BEYOND TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE REPORTING? 
An obvious subsequent question is how the ‘inclusive approach’ 
can in practice be implemented beyond ‘triple bottom line 
reporting’. Even if triple bottom line reporting can be ‘a vital 
source of moral resuscitation in business life’, as has been 
claimed, it is still dependent for its success on stakeholder 
engagement, organisational integrity and stakeholder activism.55 
These all require that stakeholders have adequate resources and 
experience to enter into dialogue with companies, that there is 
an active stakeholder culture in society and that companies are 
willing to work with them to find optimal solutions. In the 
South African context, the existence of these conditions cannot 
be taken for granted.56  
                                                                                                                                                 
See also P Newell “Citizenship, Accountability and Community: The 
Limits of the CSR Agenda” International Affairs, 2005, 81, 3, 541 – 557. 
54 Bond, (2008), at 1038.  
55 See M Painter-Morland, (2006), at 353 
56  See Fig, D. (2005), “Manufacturing Amnesia: CSR in South Africa” 
International Affairs, 81, 3, 599 – 617, at 612 – 614  
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Suggestions as to how stakeholder engagement can be achieved 
range from the adoption of formal corporate governance 
mechanisms – for example, appointing stakeholders on to the 
board57 – to less formal methods such as entering into 
partnerships and collaborative ventures with stakeholders. 
Whichever method is envisaged as most appropriate, critical 
challenges such as how the company’s social responsibilities 
can be integrated successfully into its corporate governance 
regime, identifying who the relevant stakeholders are, 
understanding their needs, how openness and transparency can 
be promoted and how conflict can be managed will need to be 
met.58  
 
                                                          
57 Ayuson, S. & Argandona, A. “Responsible Corporate Governance: 
Towards a Stakeholder Board of Directors?” IESE Business School 
Working Paper No 701, July 2007, University of Navarra, at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1349090> , Spisto, M. 
(2005) “Unitary Board or Two Tier Board for the New South Africa?” 
International Review of Business Research Papers, 1, 2, 84 – 99  
58 The general literature on forming partnerships with stakeholders is 
extensive – but see in particular, Waddock, S. (2001), “Integrity and 
Mindfulness: Foundations of Corporate Citizenship” Journal of Corporate 
Citizenship, 1, 25 – 37, Payne, SL. & Calton, JM. (2002), “Towards a 
Managerial Practice of Stakeholder Engagement: Developing Multi 
Stakeholder Learning Dialogues” in Rahman, SS. Waddock, S. Andriof, J. 
& Husted, B. (eds.) Unfolding Stakeholder Thinking: Theory, 
Responsibility and Engagement, Sheffield: Greenleaf, 121 – 136, Painter-
Morland, M. “TBL Reporting as Social Grammar: Integrating CSR and 
Corporate Codes of Conduct” Business Ethics: A European Review, 2006, 
15(4), 352 – 364, Burchell, J. & Cook, J. (2006), “Assessing the impact of 
stakeholder dialogue: changing relationships between NGOs and 
companies”, Journal of Public Affairs, 6, 3-4, 210 – 227, Burchell, J. & 
Cook, J. (2008), “Stakeholder Dialogue and Organisational Learning: 
Changing Relationships between Companies and NGOs,” Business Ethics: 
A European Review, 17, 1, 35 – 46. 
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Stakeholder engagement requires an environment and 
mechanisms which enable companies and their stakeholders to 
manage and sustain their interactions. In many developed 
countries, stable economic and legal environments enable these 
to be managed relatively harmoniously. In such countries, a 
legal framework to resolve conflicts often exists and the media 
can play an effective role in highlighting company practices. 
Stakeholder groups may be well resourced and possess 
experience of dealing with companies.59 
 
In developing countries however, relations between companies 
and their stakeholders are less likely to be managed in such 
ways. In the South African case, as in many others, attracting 
foreign business and investment in order to enable economic 
growth often dominates political agendas, and stakeholder 
needs may therefore recede in importance. Stakeholders’ ability 
to challenge company actions is often hampered by weak 
experience and resources, a lack of legal literacy, a distrust of 
legal processes and in some cases intimidation by the 
authorities.60 Where stakeholders lack the resources and 
                                                          
59 Readers are referred to Parades, T. (2004), “A Systems Approach to 
Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn't 
the Answer” William and Mary Law Review, 45, 3, 1055 – 1158 which 
discusses in detail the fundamental differences in the formal and 
information institutions in developed and developing countries and argues 
that it is misguided to expect corporate governance in countries in which 
these institutions are less developed to function in the same manner as that 
in developed countries. We apply the same arguments in the context of 
stakeholder engagement.  
60 Lund Thomsen, P. “Corporate Accountability in South Africa: The Role 
of Community Mobilising in Environmental governance” International 
Affairs, 2005, 81(3), 619 – 633, at 630 – 631 and Hamann, R. & Acutt, N. 
(2003) “How Should Civil society and the government respond to ‘CSR’? 
 
 
24
experience to represent themselves, problems are likely to arise 
in calling companies to account for their actions or inactions. 
The argument that ‘corporate morality pays’ – typically 
deployed in developed countries – is likely to ring hollow in 
such circumstances.  
 
We now turn to examine key issues for South African 
employees and show the limitations of corporate action in 
addressing the considerable problems which employees face.  
 
3. CASE STUDIES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The case studies in this section demonstrate some of the key 
issues for employees in South Africa and indeed more widely on 
the continent. They have been chosen to illustrate central socio-
economic challenges which the corporate sector can help tackle. 
The widespread failure of the corporate sector to resolve issues, 
or, (as in the exceptional case of Anglo American immediately 
below) the contingency of their partial success in these major 
areas underpins the argument which we develop below: that the 
state must strengthen its regulatory capacity. 
3.2 THE EMPLOYEE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC: AN 
UNEVEN COPORATE RESPONSE 
South Africa has the largest number of HIV infected people in 
the world, and HIV/AIDS is the single largest cause of 
premature death in the country. It is estimated that 
approximately 16% of the South African population is infected 
                                                                                                                                                 
A critique of business motivations and the potential for partnerships” 
Development Southern Africa, 20, 2, 255 – 270 at 265 – 266  
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with HIV.61 Management of the disease is particularly pertinent 
in the mining and extractive industries. The mining industry is 
crucial to South Africa, with precious metals contributing 65% 
to the country's mineral export earnings and 21% of total 
exports of goods in 2006. South Africa supplies about 80% of 
the world's platinum. The industry is also South Africa's biggest 
employer, with around 460, 000 employees and another 400, 
000 employed by suppliers of goods and services to the 
industry. With a quarter of mine workers affected by 
HIV/AIDS, mining operations suffer through illness, 
absenteeism, low productivity and untimely deaths unless the 
epidemic is effectively managed.62 The need for companies to 
manage HIV/AIDS thus transcends altruism.63 Companies such 
as Anglo American PLC, BHP Billiton, Xstrata, Eskom, De 
Beers and SAPREF, have all introduced programs to combat 
HIV/AIDS – ranging from education and prevention, to testing, 
counselling, medical care and support, operating mobile clinics 
and health centres, to the provision of anti retroviral therapy.64 
Yet the scope of and investment in these schemes varies very 
considerably.  Most of them have generally met with limited 
success.  
                                                          
61 Overseas Development Institute “AIDS and the Private Sector: The Case 
of South Africa” (2007), 1 – 4, at 
<http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/427.pdf> 
62 See “Mining and Minerals in South Africa” (2008), at 
<http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/sectors/mining.htm> and 
Fearnley, CJ. “HIV and AIDS risk management at Rustenburg Section, 
Anglo Platinum” (2005), Applied Earth Science: IMM Transactions 
Section B, 114, 3, 146 – 153  
63 Bolton, P. (2008) “Corporate Responses to HIV/AIDS: Experience and 
Leadership from South Africa” Business and Society Review, 113, 2, 277 – 
300, at 277 – 278.  
64 Bolton, P. (2008), Fig, D. (2005), at 608 – 610. 
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However, more comprehensive initiatives taken by Anglo 
American plc exceptionally proved relatively successful in 
tackling the disease among their workers.65 In 2009, Anglo 
American won the Global Business Coalition’s Business 
Excellence Award for this programme. In this case, the 
companies’ practice in South Africa was exported to other 
operations elsewhere on the continent.   
Anglo American is an exceptional company in that, unlike its 
competitors, it played a role in opposition to Apartheid.  The 
key factors identified for the successful initiative were very 
specific and included (i) a recognition that whilst the costs of 
tackling the disease was high, the long-term costs of low level 
involvement for the company would be even higher (ii) a 
recognition by the company of the need for involvement by 
national trade unions in devising a strategy for HIV/AIDS 
management (iii) crucially, the support given by international 
union partners to ensure the smooth facilitation of this 
collaboration (iv) The long history of cooperation between 
senior personnel in the company and the unions was central in 
enabling a holistic and sustained programme to be adopted. The 
willingness to include unions in its HIV/AIDS management 
programme brought major returns to the company’s investment 
in the shape of increased productivity and profits and also in the 
                                                          
65 Croucher, R & Cotton, E. Global Unions, Global Business, Middlesex 
University Press, 2009.  
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shape of huge increases in the take up of diagnosis and 
treatment by employees.66 
 
In other industries, such as construction, the position is less 
promising and an equivalent to the Anglo American plc case is 
lacking. The response in construction has simply been to 
dismiss workers who are affected by HIV/AIDs. The industry’s 
fragmented nature, low barriers to new entrants, high 
casualisation rates (60% of its workers are from the informal 
sector), the prevalence of subcontracting and the emergence of 
many small contractors all increase the complexity of 
developing an effective strategy which targets all of those 
employed.67 The construction industry also prioritises 
occupational safety rather than health issues, which directly 
impacts the support health related programs receive.68 Efforts 
by civil society in this area have also only brought about patchy 
results.  
 
                                                          
66 See also Middleton, C. (2005) “Interview with Michael Spicer, Chief 
Executive, South Africa Foundation” Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 18, 
21 – 24  
67 Meintjes, I. Bowen, P & Root, D. (2007) “HIV/AIDS in the South 
African Construction Industry: Understanding the HIV/AIDS discourse for 
a sector specific response” Construction Management and Economics, 25, 
3, 255 – 266  
68 Meintjes, I. Bowen, P & Root, D. (2007), at 259. For empirical studies 
on the impact of HIV/AIDS in the construction sector in South Africa, see 
Deacon, C. & Smallwood, J. (2003) “Health promotion in South African 
construction”, Journal of Construction Research, 4, 2, 129 – 140, Haupt, 
TC & Smallwood, J. (2004), “HIV and AIDS in SA construction: attitudes 
and perceptions of workers”, Journal of Construction Research, 5, 2, 311– 
327, Haupt, TC, Munshi, M & Smallwood, J, (2005) “HIV and AIDS in 
South African construction: is age nothing but a number?” Construction 
Management and Economics, 23, 1, 107 – 130, Haupt, TC, Deacon, C & 
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A further hindrance to the development of effective strategies to 
counter HIV/AIDS has been ambivalence toward HIV/AIDS 
management on the part of the government itself.69 It has 
therefore been argued that the government must introduce a 
compulsory, industry wide initiative to tackle the problem. This, 
it has been suggested by experts, should involve education, 
testing and treatment programmes, supported through formal 
certification and funded through levies.70  
 
3.3 THE MINING SECTOR AND SAFETY: 
CONTINUING FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 
 
South Africa has some of the world’s most dangerous mining 
operations because of the labour intensive methods used. 
Fatality and injury rates (caused by blasting, drilling, tremors 
and rock falls) are three times the equivalent in countries such 
as Canada and Australia – although South Africa has similarly 
                                                                                                                                                 
Smallwood, J. (2005), “Importance of healthy older construction workers”, 
Acta Structilia, 12, 1, 1–19. 
69 “Aids experts condemn SA minister” 6 September 2006, at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/5319680.stm>, “New HIV row as 
South African who shunned drugs dies” 26 May 2006, at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/may/26/southafrica.aids>, “South 
African government ends Aids denial” 28 October 2006, at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/oct/28/southafrica.aids>, “A 
President in denial, a ravaged nation denied hope” 10 August 2007, at 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/a-president-in-denial-a-
ravaged-nation-denied-hope-460967.html>, PS Jones, (2005), “A Test of 
Governance: Rights Based Struggles and the Politics of HIV/AIDS policy 
in South Africa” Political Geography, 24, 4, 419 – 447, FG McNeill, 
(2009) “Condoms Cause Aids: Poison, Prevention and Denial in Venda, 
South Africa” African Affairs, 108, 432, 353 – 370, SC Kalichman, (2009), 
Denying AIDS: Conspiracy Theories, Pseudoscience, and Human 
Tragedy, Springer Science + Business Media. 
70 Bowen, P. Dorrington, R. Distiller, G. Lake, H. & Besesar, S. (2008) 
“HIV/AIDS in the South African construction industry: an empirical 
study” Construction Management and Economics, 26, 8, 827 – 839 
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stringent occupational health and safety laws.71 Despite 
continuing discussion, target-setting and the enactment of new 
laws, about two hundred workers still die annually in South 
African mines.72 Many companies defend themselves by 
arguing that they have taken steps to minimise fatalities and 
maximise safety – such as through training, implementation of 
strict safety policies and investing in world class technology to 
enhance mine security systems. The blame is placed on workers 
for not complying with safety procedures. Unions, on the other 
hand, point out that companies have prime responsibility for 
safety under the law and accuse them of not fully accepting that 
responsibility. Unions have not only demanded stricter penalties 
against companies for mining accidents, but have also called for 
pay rates to be structured so that workers receive a larger basic 
wage and less bonus-related income. The key issue here is that 
workers take more risks when their income is largely 
determined by bonus. Increased basic wages have however, 
been opposed by companies on the grounds that workers paid a 
                                                          
71 “Unsafe Behaviour is Normal Behaviour” Finweek, 2/28/2008, p 91 
72 A recent safety audit released in South Africa showed that overall mine 
safety was running at an average of just 66%. See “South Africa Mine 
Deaths Continue to Rise” ICEM in Brief, 4 May 2009, at 
<http://www.icem.org/en/78-ICEM-InBrief/3186-South-Africa-Mine-
Deaths-Continue-to-Rise>, “Gold Fields Struck by 5 SA Mining Deaths in 
past month” ICEM in Brief , 29 June, 2009 at 
<http://www.icem.org/en/97-Sustainable-Development-Health-and-
Safety/3281-Gold-Fields-Struck-by-5-South-African-Mining-Deaths-in-
Past-Month>, Creamer, M. “Mine deaths worsening, Section 28 artisans in 
many accidents” 17 March 2009, at 
<http://www.miningweekly.com/article/mine-safety-slumps-as-more-die---
num-2009-03-17>, “More Deaths Inside and Outside of SA’s Mines” 
ICEM in Brief , 22 September 2008, at <http://www.icem.org/en/25-Sub-
Saharan-Africa/2774-More-Deaths-Inside-and-Outside-of-South-
Africa%E2%80%99s-Mines>. 
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higher basic wage would have no incentive to work 
efficiently.73  
 
Some limited progress has been made.  The state recently 
passed laws to enhance mine safety. They provide that mine 
safety investigations must be carried out within ten days of 
accident occurrence and that reports must be issued within 30 
days. They also give mine safety inspectors new powers. 
Controversially, the new laws expose company executives to a 
five-fold increase in fines and penalties if convicted of 
responsibility for health and safety accidents or deaths.74 The 
mining industry has criticised these laws as punitive.75 
Nevertheless, neither companies nor the state are prepared to 
move on the fundamental issue of wage composition despite its 
importance and the fact that many companies operating in the 
developed world have tackled it76.  The government is 
understandably reluctant to intervene in company decisions on 
systems of wage payment.  Yet the equally important question 
of increased rights for worker safety representatives, considered 
by leading experts on mining safety as key to reducing death 
and injury, remains unresolved. These international experts 
argue, with the unions, that employee safety representatives 
                                                          
73 Ryan, B. (2008), “Minefield” Finweek, May 15, 2008, 14 – 16  
74 See “South African Parliament Passes Mine Safety Reform; Year-long 
Safety Audit Still Held-up” ICEM in Brief, 1 December 2008, at 
<http://www.icem.org/en/97-Sustainable-Development-Health-and-
Safety/2871-South-African-Parliament-Passes-Mine-Safety-Reform;-Year-
long-Safety-Audit-Still-Held-up> 
75 See Bearak, B. “South Africa is aiming to ease dangers of gold mining” 
21 November 2008, at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/world/africa/21iht-
21goldmine.18022573.html> 
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require stronger powers than they currently enjoy if the level of 
fatalities is to be reduced.77   
 
3.4 BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT  
After apartheid, the government established policies to enhance 
‘black economic empowerment’ (BEE), a matter relevant both 
to employees and potential employees. BEE is regulated by 
laws, non binding codes of practice and industry charters. The 
most important is the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act 2003.78 Section 1 of the Act defines black 
economic empowerment as:  
“… the economic empowerment of all black people including 
women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people 
living in rural areas, through diverse but integrated 
socioeconomic strategies, that include, but are not limited to: 
a) increasing the number of black people that manage, own and 
control enterprises and productive assets; 
b) facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and 
productive assets by communities, workers, co-operatives and 
other collective enterprises; 
c) human resource and skills development;, 
d) achieving equitable representation in all occupational 
categories and levels in the workforce; 
e) preferential procurement; and 
f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black 
people.” 
 
Codes of practice have been issued under the Act to promote its 
objectives; namely to transform South Africa's economy to 
                                                                                                                                                 
76 See note 69. 
77 Johnstone, R. Quinlan, M. & Walters, D. “Statutory Occupational 
Health and Safety Workplace Arrangements for the Modern Labour 
Market” (2005), Journal of Industrial Relations, 47, 1, 93 – 116  
78 The Act may be viewed at 
<http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68031> 
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allow meaningful participation by black people. Inter alia, this 
entails substantially changing the racial profile of companies' 
owners, managers and skilled professionals, increasing the 
ownership and management of companies by black women, 
communities, workers, cooperatives and others, and helping 
them access more economic opportunities. It also involves 
promoting investment that leads to broad-based and meaningful 
participation in the economy by black people, helping rural and 
local communities access economic opportunities and 
promoting access to finance.79 Some industries (e.g. mining, 
construction, transport, financial, tourism and energy) have 
signed their own “charters” specifying how companies should 
meet BEE objectives.80 Under the 2003 Act, companies are 
encouraged to act to promote BEE strategies and to agree to be 
evaluated against specific scorecards.81 Although BEE is 
voluntary for companies, there are clear incentives for them to 
meet its objectives: BEE ‘points’ are taken into consideration by 
the government (in some cases a requirement) when companies 
                                                          
79 For more information on the codes see 
<http://www.southafrica.info/business/trends/empowerment/BEE-
codes.htm > .  
80 McAllister, A & Ramjee, N. “Companies Doing Business In South 
Africa: How Does Black Economic Empowerment Affect You?” at 
<http://www.bowman.co.za/LawArticles/Law-
Article.asp?id=1001950359> Arya, B. & Bassi, B. (2009), “Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Legislation in South Africa: Codes of Good Practice”, Business & Society, 
doi:10.1177/0007650309332261 . 
81 The scorecards measure the BEE status of a company (direct 
empowerment, ownership and management of enterprises and assets, 
human resource development through skills development and employment 
equity, indirect empowerment in the form of preferential procurement and 
enterprise development), giving it a score out of 100. The charters and 
scorecards for various industries in South African can be viewed at 
<http://www.workinfo.com/BEE/index.htm#Sector%20Charters%20and%
20Scorecards > 
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tender for business, apply for licences and concessions, enter 
into public-private partnerships, or buy state-owned assets. 
Thus, companies with higher BEE scores will enjoy preference 
in these instances. 82 
However, the evidence shows that BEE policies have failed to 
enhance black economic empowerment and may in fact have  
discredited the concept. Research indicates that the gap between 
rich and poor has grown since 1994, and that within the black 
community itself, inequality has increased significantly. Thus 
far, the main beneficiaries of empowerment transactions have 
been a small number of black business people. Moreover, 
despite attempts to ensure employment equity, the black 
community is still under-trained and seriously under-
represented in top and senior management posts. Thirdly, 
efforts to increase black share ownership in companies listed on 
the Johannesburg Securities Exchange have brought 
disappointing results.83 
 
It has been suggested that a major reason for BEE’s failure is 
that it has not been regarded as an issue which needs to be 
addressed and directed by the state but has been allowed to 
                                                          
82 FW de Clerk Foundation, “Transformation and Black Economic 
Empowerment in South Africa, April 2006” at 
<http://www.fwdklerk.org.za/cgi-
bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&cause_id=2137&news_id=7112
6&cat_id=1596 > , Altman, M. (2006), “Wage Determination in South 
Africa – What do we know?” Transformation, 60, 58 – 89 (discussing 
efficient and equitable wage determination), Makgetla, N. (2006), “BEE 
and Class Formation” New Agenda, 22, 47 – 58 (discussing employment 
equity), Valodia, I. Lebani, L. Skinner, C. & Devey, R. (2006), “Low 
Waged and Informal Employment in South Africa” Transformation, 60, 90 
– 126 (assessing the state of knowledge of the labour market in South 
Africa) 
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operate in a framework effectively directed by the corporate 
sector. The effects of privatization and other related policies 
effectively took control over BEE away from the government 
and placed it in the hands of the corporate sector. Some have 
dubbed this the ‘managerialisation’ of BEE, arguing that the 
shifting of responsibility for achieving BEE objectives to 
companies has defeated its redistributive intentions.84 BEE has 
been treated as a framework to be managed according to the 
voluntary principles of Corporate Social Responsibility, rather 
than as one of the responsibilities of an elected government.85 
Without the government imposing mandatory compliance, the 
decision to give effect to BEE strategy hinges on a cost-benefit 
analysis by companies to determine if compliance will bolster 
their profits.86 As a result, the black population continues to be 
disenfranchised in areas such as land, employment and skills 
development. 87  
                                                                                                                                                 
83 FW de Clerk Foundation, ibid. at 15 – 32  
84 Ponte, S. Roberts, S. & van Sittert, L. (2007) “Black Economic 
Empowerment, Business and the State in South Africa”, Development and 
Change, 38, 5, 933 – 955, at 934 – 935, 937, 950.  
85 See also Harrison, R. “Moeletsi Mbeki: Black empowerment has failed” 
19 June, 2009, at <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-06-19-moeletsi-
mbeki-black-empowerment-has-failed> . For an argument that the political 
system in the UK is similarly unresponsive to employees, see Sikka, P. 
“Corporate Governance: What about the Workers?” (2008), Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 21, 7, 955 – 977. Despite allusions to 
“principles” based corporate governance there are no corporate structures, 
policies or processes to achieve an equitable distribution of income and 
wealth (at pg. 970). 
86 E Hoffman, (2008), “A Wolf In Sheep's Clothing: Discrimination 
Against The Majority Undermines Equality, While Continuing To Benefit 
Few Under The Guise Of Black Economic Empowerment”, Syracuse 
Journal of International Law and Commerce, 36, 87 – 115 , at 99 – 101   
87 See also Tangri, R. & Southall, R. (2008), “The Politics of Black 
Economic Empowerment in South Africa” Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 34, 3, 699 – 716 which discuss how reconciling BEE objectives 
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Thus, in each of our important cases, relying on companies 
themselves to take care of the needs of employees has brought 
limited results. In themselves, the concepts of ‘inclusivity’ 
‘corporate social responsibility’ ‘good corporate citizenship’ (so 
heavily promoted in the corporate sector by the King Codes) 
have not resolved the significant difficulties which employees 
face. Given the similar ‘soft law’ nature of King III, it is likely 
that its impact will be similarly restricted.  
 
What of the potential offered by the new Companies Act 2008 
for companies to address the needs of employees? We discussed 
the possibilities it offers employees to protect themselves when 
their interests are harmed (declaration of delinquency and 
probation, business rescue proceedings and derivative actions) 
above.  
 
We argue that their potential in guarding the position of 
employees is also limited.  Firstly, the Act introduced an 
interesting new regime in terms of which directors may be (i) 
declared delinquent or (ii) placed on probation as a result of 
certain conduct. But the ability of employees to apply for such a 
declaration only arises in very narrow circumstances, i.e. likely 
only in cases of extreme misconduct by the director. Secondly, 
under the Act, the decision to initiate business rescue 
proceedings is no longer a decision to be made solely by the 
board. It has, for the first time, extended this decision to 
                                                                                                                                                 
with capitalist-led economic growth remains problematic for the 
government. 
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employees and allows them to participate in these proceedings. 
It is entirely possible that a trade union will make such an 
application where, for example, a multinational wished to cease 
operations in South Africa and wanted to liquidate its South 
African subsidiary. But again, this is a very narrow right, 
exercisable only when the company is in financial difficulty. 
Thirdly, despite the ability of employees to commence 
derivative actions against the board, there are significant 
procedural hurdles they must overcome before leave to apply is 
granted. Section165(5) provides that the court may grant leave 
only if, it is satisfied that the applicant is acting in good faith, 
that the proposed or continuing proceedings involve the trial of 
a serious question of material consequence to the company and 
that it is in the best interests of the company that the applicant 
be granted leave to commence the proposed proceedings or 
continue the proceedings, as the case may be. These may be 
very difficult for employees to prove, especially where the 
board is unlikely to share information with them. Given that the 
derivative action is traditionally viewed as an action of last 
resort in addressing the behaviour of directors,88 it remains to be 
seen to what extent the courts will be willing to depart from this 
approach. In addition, under the ‘business judgement rule’, 
directors will have satisfied their duties if they took reasonably 
diligent steps to become informed about the matter, had no 
material financial interest in the matter or had properly 
disclosed such interest, and made a decision rationally in the 
belief that it was in the best interests of the company.89   
                                                          
88 The rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189 
89 s76(4) Companies Act 2008 
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4. CONCLUSION  
 
Trends in South African corporate governance show a move 
toward an ‘inclusive approach’ to company management. These 
are evidenced both in corporate governance ‘soft’ as well as 
‘hard’ law.  Viewed in international perspective these have 
certainly been distinctive in the rights that they give employees 
and their representatives. However, as our case studies have 
shown, company reactions to date have, even in the face of very 
serious problems, been uneven at best. The combination of 
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ law are unlikely to yield the hoped-for results.  
It remains to be seen how the courts will interpret the new law.  
Nevertheless, progress in improving employees’ position seems 
likely to continue to be slow and uneven unless the state takes a 
more direct role in overseeing company actions and advancing 
employee interests.  
 
We therefore join with other scholars in calling for the state to 
enact further ‘hard law’, transcending the limited areas covered 
in the Companies Act and the ‘soft law’ in the King Codes.  
Further ‘hard law’ in support of employee rights is required for 
three distinct reasons. First, it can set high standards for 
companies to follow, or at least provide incentives for them to 
attain these standards. It can be enforced against errant 
companies through the imposition of a variety of penalties – 
fines, imprisonment, suspension of licences, injunctions and 
institution of criminal proceedings. Serious financial and 
 
 
38
reputational consequences may follow from the use of these 
powers against non compliant companies.90 Core issues such as 
meeting labour and human rights standards can be more 
comprehensively, clearly and unambiguously regulated.91 
Secondly, hard law can provide benchmarks defining and 
crucially, accurately measuring the developmental impact of 
‘CSR’. Existing measures (case studies, company level 
assessments, evaluations by civil society, and international 
ratings and rankings) provide only partial pictures of the impact 
of CSR actions, due to low data reliability, diverse and complex 
methodologies and a lack of comparability between methods.92 
Clear legal standards on the other hand, make it possible to 
monitor compliance, control corruption and detect unethical 
behaviour. Thirdly, strong laws which are adequately enforced 
build state legitimacy; conversely non functioning legislation 
undermines it.93 An array of hard law to provide housing, health 
and education, tackle corruption, enforce labour standards, 
protect human rights, prevent resource depletion and control 
                                                          
90 Lynch-Fannon, I. (2007) “Corporate Social Responsibility Movement 
and Law's Empire: Is There a Conflict?” at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=988944>, McInerney, 
T. “Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Binding Norms of 
CSR” 2007, Cornell International Law Journal, 40, 171 – 200. 
91 McInerney, (2007), at 184 – 190, International Council on Human 
Rights Policy, “Beyond Voluntarism” 2002, 1 – 16 at 
<http://www.ichrp.org/files/summaries/7/107_summary_en.pdf>, R 
Barkmeyer, “Legitimacy as a Key Driver and Determinant of CSR in 
Developing Countries” Paper for the 2007 Marie Curie Summer School on 
Earth System Governance, 28 May – 06 June 2007, Amsterdam, 1 – 23, at 
<http://www.2007amsterdamconference.org/Downloads/07SummerSchool
%20-%20Barkemeyer.pdf>, Nwete, B. (2007), UE Ite, “Multinationals and 
CSR in developing countries: a case study of Nigeria” 2004, CSR And 
Environmental Management, 11, 1, 1 – 11 
92 Hamann, R. (2007) “Is Corporate Citizenship Making a Difference?” 
Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 28, 15 – 29, at 17 & 22    
93 McInerney, 2007, at 193 – 194 
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industrial pollution already exists in South Africa.94 The 
challenge is therefore to enforce these laws in order to meet 
socio-economic needs. 
 
We do not argue for regulatory formalism. Rather, enforcement 
may be conducted through sophisticated modern approaches as 
recommended by regulation experts. The now widely-accepted 
principles of ‘responsive regulation’ emphasise the importance 
of regulators starting at the persuasive base of a pyramid of 
sanctions and responding to companies’ behaviours as 
appropriate. The importance of taking account of  a wide range 
of contextual considerations, of using persuasion and of 
educational work with companies have also been cogently 
argued and should not be neglected. Experts nevertheless also 
agree that a robust set of sanctions must be available to 
regulators.95  
 
A political intervention is under way in South Africa to broaden 
the legal duties of directors and improve employee rights.  We 
                                                          
94 They include the Employment Equity Act 1998, Skills Development Act 
1998, Mine Health and Safety Act 1995, National Water Act 1998, 
National Environmental Management Act 1998, Broad Based Black 
Empowerment Act 2003, Air Quality Bill 2003. See Visser, W. “Corporate 
Citizenship in South Africa: A Review of Progress Since Democracy” 
(2005), Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 18, 29 – 38.  
95 The influential ‘responsive regulation’ concept was initiated by I. Ayres 
and J. Braithwaite in Responsive Regulation.  Transcending the Regulation 
Debate, Oxford University Press. (1995). On recent developments in the 
influential approach see Baldwin, R & Black, J. “Really responsive 
regulation” (2007) LSE Law, Society and Economics working paper, 
15/2007, Department of Law, LSE, London.  On the importance of 
penalties, see Metcalf, D. “Why Has the British National Minimum Wage 
Had Little or No Impact on Employment?” Centre for Economic 
Performance Discussion Paper 781, LSE, London. 
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have questioned whether corporate ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ law are the 
most appropriate vehicle through which to promote the interests 
of employees. Despite the optimism which they have generated, 
they in fact appear insufficient to tackle the difficulties which 
employees face. More hard law and better enforcement of the 
laws that exist will be required if government’s aims to improve 
levels of social justice are to be realised.   
